A child must live in Florida for 6 months before a divorce can be filed.

ERROR TO MAKE AN INITIAL CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATION WHEN FLORIDA WAS NOT THE CHILD'S HOME STATE.

The Wife appealed from a portion of the trial court's final judgment of dissolution. It is undisputed that the child lived with her parents in North Carolina and then, after their separation, with her mother in Wisconsin, during the six months before the former husband commenced the dissolution proceedings in Duval County, where he was a legal resident. The District Court held: "[U]under section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2008), of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Florida was not the child's home state and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination."

Collier v. Collier, 29 So.3d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

A judge could hold a person in contempt of court for lying on the affidavit.

ERROR TO MAKE AN INITIAL CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATION WHEN FLORIDA WAS NOT THE CHILD'S HOME STATE.

The Wife appealed from a portion of the trial court's final judgment of dissolution. It is undisputed that the child lived with her parents in North Carolina and then, after their separation, with her mother in Wisconsin, during the six months before the former husband commenced the dissolution proceedings in Duval County, where he was a legal resident. The District Court held: "[U]under section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2008), of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Florida was not the child's home state and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination."

Collier v. Collier, 29 So.3d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)

$65 million offered as a marriage bounty!

http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/26/14114021-hong-kong-playboy-tycoon-offers-65-million-to-find-husband-for-lesbian-daughter?lite

Hong Kong 'playboy tycoon' offers $65 million to find husband for lesbian daughter

By NBC News staff

Hong Kong property and shipping magnate Cecil Chao Sze-tsung announced he would offer HK$500 million (about $65 million) to the man who can woo and marry his 33-year-old daughter, Gigi Chao, the South China Morning Post reported.

"It is an inducement to attract someone who has the talent but not the capital to start his own business," Chao told the BBC.

"I don't mind whether he is rich or poor. The important thing is that he is generous and kind-hearted," he added. "Gigi is a very good woman with both talents and looks. She is devoted to her parents, is generous and does volunteer work."

According to the Post report, the announcement came just one week after Chao's daughter revealed she had married her female partner of seven years, Sean Eav, in France earlier this year.  The tycoon, 76, told the Post the reports of his daughter being married were "false." According to the article, same-sex marriage is not legally recognized in Hong Kong, although civil unions are performed in France.  Chao, whom the Post describes as "Hong Kong's pre-eminent playboy tycoon," told the BBC that Gigi Chao was single and needed a "good husband." Chao has never married himself, and he once claimed to have slept with 10,000 women, the South China Morning Post reported.  According to the BBC, Chao said he wouldn't force Gigi to marry a man against her will.  Gigi Chao runs Haut Monde Talent, a modeling and public relations company. She is the first of three children that Chao had with different women, according to the Global Post.

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My opinion of this story is that the father will totally alienate his daughter from him.  Can you imagine how many men are scheming at this point?  If she never trusted men before, she surely won't now!  If she ever did marry a man, how long until a divorce?

When does the judge require the Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees

In the case of Baker v. Baker, 35 So.3d 76 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010), the Court stated the trial court committed error because there was a lack of evidence supporting the temporary attorney fee.  The Husband appealed from the trial court's order awarding temporary attorney's fees to the Wife. There was sparse testimony regarding fees at the hearing below. The Wife testified that she borrowed $4,500 to retain counsel and that $1,800 was spent on four days of depositions. No other evidence was presented regarding the Wife's attorney's hourly rate, or the number of hours expended on the case. The trial court found that the Wife had the need, and the Husband had the ability to pay $7,500. The husband challenged the lack of evidence to support the amount awarded and challenged the need for a remand, arguing that the Wife had failed to produce evidence to support her claim for temporary relief. The District Court held:

1. "To obtain an award of temporary attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, '[t]he party seeking fees must prove with evidence the reasonableness and the necessity of the fee sought.'"

2. "Here, the trial court did not make factual findings regarding the reasonableness of the attorney's fees and, in fact, could not do so because no evidence was presented to support findings on a reasonable hourly rate. Further, limited information was presented as to the time expended or to be expended."

3. "Because the record does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support a determination on the reasonableness of the fees awarded, we reverse the appealed order to the extent that it awarded $7500 in temporary attorney's fees."

4. "[A] temporary award does not create vested rights, and the trial court may modify or vacate a temporary award at any time during the litigation. We thus remand for further proceedings for the trial court to determine a reasonable temporary fee award and for the trial court to make findings to support that award."

Who has to pay the transfer cost of a retirement fund?

In the case of Seawell v. Hargarten, 28 So.3d 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) the Court ruled that it is the responsibility of the spouse in possession of the asset to effectuate the transfer.

            The parties entered into a Consent Final Judgment which, in pertinent part, required the Husband to pay to the Wife a total of $65,470 in cash and to also transfer to the Wife 50% of the shares of an Oppenheimer Mutual Fund. The Husband was required to do so by August 1st. Prior to the deadline, the Husband sent the Wife two checks totaling $24,700 and $24,327, thus leaving a balance owed of $16,443 as to the cash payment. On July 31st, the Husband sent a letter authorizing his broker to transfer 100% of the shares in the mutual fund to the Wife. At the time, the Fund had a value of $29,477.84. In other words, the Husband was attempting to apply the cash value of his 50% of the Fund ($14,738.92) toward the outstanding balance due on the required cash payment. Before he authorized the transfer of the Fund, the Husband had advised his counsel that he did not have enough cash to pay the $16,443 owed to the Wife. An exchange of emails then took place between the parties' counsel. The Husband's attorney asked the Wife's attorney if she would accept stock from the Fund toward the outstanding balance and the Wife's attorney replied that it did not matter how the Wife got her money "as long as she got all of it." On August 1st, the Wife wrote to the broker of the Fund accepting only her 50% of the Fund. Since the two authorization letters did not match, the broker did not transfer any shares of the Fund to the Wife. The Wife then filed an enforcement motion which the trial court denied, finding that the Wife could have accepted the Husband's offer to transfer the entire Fund to her. The District Court reversed:

1. "First, the authorization letter sent by the Husband, unlike the one sent by the Wife, did not comply with the terms of the Final Judgment. Second, the Husband made no further effort to assure the Fund assets were transferred."

2. "Clearly, to avoid responsibility, an individual must be able to demonstrate that the failure of the transfer to occur was due to factors beyond their control. In essence, the Husband would be able to show, that in spite of his efforts, it was impossible to transfer the assets. Certainly, this is not the case here."

Is a pre-nup valid if signed 10 days before a marriage?

In the case of Gordon v. Gordon, 25 So.3d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement ten days prior to their marriage. Neither party had legal counsel but had discussed the agreement for several months. The wife was "an individual with a high level of education and business acumen who, having twice married, understood the significance of the document she was about to sign and chose not to seek the advice of a lawyer." The agreement essentially provided that each party's property at the time of the marriage would remain his or her separate property.  In his financial disclosure, the husband listed various pension accounts but did not specify the pension he would receive from his employer. The court affirmed:

1. "We first address whether the agreement was reached under duress, coercion or overreaching. The record before us presents the former wife as an individual with a high level of education and business acumen who, having twice married, understood the significance of the document she was about to sign and chose not to seek the advice of a lawyer. And, while the parties disagreed over the amount of time the former wife had to contemplate the agreement, we hold that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by declaring that a period of ten days prior to the marriage is sufficient time for one to exercise the opportunity to review the agreement, and, if one so chooses, to seek the advice of legal counsel." 

2. "We next address whether the former husband's failure to specifically disclose his airline pension plan constitutes fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The agreement specifically provided that each party shall retain as separate property all retirement accounts and property listed on the attached schedules."

3. "Additionally, the agreement included a provision specifically addressing pension benefits under its own section heading. The former husband's schedule of property referenced "Retirement Plans (Keogh, 401(k), etc)" and specifically listed the former husband's 401(k) plan through his employer; however, no mention was made of the airline pension plan of which the former husband was a beneficiary."

When can lump sum alimony be awarded?

In the case of Buoniconti v. Buoniconti, 36 So.3d 154 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010):

TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY BY WAY OF A LUMP SUM AWARD TO THE WIFE WAS NOT "UNFAIR" SIMPLY BECAUSE LUMP SUM ALIMONY IS A VESTED RIGHT THAT WOULD SURVIVE REMARRIAGE.

Prior to the dissolution hearing, husband and wife resolved the majority of issues between them. The trial court was asked to consider only the wife's claim for permanent and retroactive alimony and her claim that the liquid marital assets should be distributed unequally due to the husband's dissipation of certain marital assets during the marriage. At the close of the dissolution proceedings, the trial court awarded the wife permanent alimony payable as lump sum as well as retroactive alimony. It also found that the husband had dissipated marital assets, and it charged those dissipated assets to the Husband in its equitable distribution scheme. The husband first contended that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the wife $261,240 in permanent alimony payable as a lump sum. The argument has two components: first, whether the wife was entitled to permanent alimony, payable as a lump sum; and second, whether the amount of the award was supported by evidence. With regard to the Husband's argument that the award was "unfair," the District Court held:

1. "At oral argument, counsel for the Husband argued that it was 'unfair' to award permanent alimony as a lump sum because the Wife would get to keep the entire award even if she chooses to remarry or cohabit." 

2. "We reject this 'unfairness' argument for three reasons. First, there was no evidence that the Wife sought permanent alimony payable as a lump sum because she was planning to remarry or cohabit…. Second, there is nothing 'unfair' about a court of equity exercising its discretion to select from the range of available options, provided that the option chosen is supported by the evidence and can withstand the applicable standard of review. Third, the Husband cannot be heard to complain simply because his chosen financial strategy did not produce the desired result. The Husband's course of conduct forced the trial court to choose between awarding the Wife nominal permanent periodic alimony or a reasonable amount of permanent alimony payable as a lump sum. The fact that the Husband's apparent strategy to avoid paying permanent alimony backfired is the risk he took when he chose that course of action. Absent legal error, a party's failed strategy is not rectifiable on appeal."

When computing alimony do you use "reported" IRS income?

In the case of McQuaig v. McQuaig, 36 So.3d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the court found:  

TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO REDUCE HUSBAND'S INCOME FOR CERTAIN CLAIMED "BUSINESS EXPENSES"; THE FACT THAT HUSBAND CAN DEDUCT EXPENSES FOR TAX PURPOSES DOES NOT MAKE THEM "ORDINARY AND NECESSARY" FOR CHAPTER 61 INCOME CALCULATION PURPOSES.

The Husband sought a modification of alimony based on his asserted decrease in income. The court ultimately reduced the alimony from $8,000 per month to $5,000 (on a temporary basis for two years) and further ordered the Husband to pay $8,500 toward the $17,200 attorney's fees incurred by the Wife during the modification proceedings. On appeal, the Husband contended that the trial court erred by failing to deduct business expenses when computing his income, specifically, that the trial court was required to deduct his "ordinary and necessary business expenses" in calculating his gross income. The District Court held:

1. "In 2008, the Former Husband earned $119,949 from his distributorship…. On his 2008 tax return, he deducted $30,028 in business expenses for an unadjusted gross taxable income of $89,921. The deducted expenses included: car and truck expenses; office expenses; repairs and maintenance; travel; deductible meals and entertainment; and 'other expenses' (telephone, internet/phone/fax; software; passport; clothing; freight; [publications]; entertainment; parking)." 

2. "Citing section 61.30, Florida Statutes, and cases interpreting that statute, the Former Husband argues the trial court was required to deduct his 'ordinary and necessary' business expenses in calculating his gross income. The statute he relies on governs child support determinations and provides that in determining a parent's monthly income for that purpose, gross income includes 'business income,' which in turn 'means gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to produce income.'"

3. "We are not persuaded section 61.30 should be applied in this case where the relevant statute is section 61.08 governing alimony awards, and that statute speaks only in terms of 'financial resources' and 'all sources of income.' But even assuming the definition of 'business income' in section 61.30 is properly applied here, the trial court did not act unreasonably in declining to accept the Former Husband's representations. Except for a $500 monthly car allowance the Former Husband received as a sales representative, there is no evidence in the record showing he incurs expenses in selling surgical equipment as a distributor that differ from those he incurred as a salesman or that previously were paid or reimbursed by his former employer. That the Former Husband can now deduct those expenses for tax purposes does not make them ipso facto 'ordinary and necessary' for Chapter 61 income calculation purposes and he has presented no authority - nor have we found any - to support such a proposition."

4. "Absent such authority or any competent, substantial evidence of what expenses are 'ordinary and necessary' to running the Former Husband's distributorship, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that his 2008 gross income was $120,000."